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ABSTRACT: After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction 
of the anti-realist argument from understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted prin-
ciple to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that 
that principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted feasible-knowability principle 
but that the overall view underlying the new principle still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appeal-
ing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the paper also argues, against the BHK semantics, for the non- con-
structive character of the demonstrations envisaged by semantic anti-realism, and contends that, in such set-
ting, one of the most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision of classical logic loses all its force.
Keywords: compositionality, demonstration, intuitionism, knowledge, manifestation, paradox of knowability, semantic 
anti-realism, truth.
RESUMEN: Tras presentar el anti-realismo semántico y la paradoja de la cognoscibilidad, el artículo ofrece una recons-
trucción del argumento anti-realista basado en la comprensión. La reconstrucción que se propone valida un 
principio irrestricto, del que se sigue que la verdad requiere la existencia de un determinado tipo de “demostra-
ción”. El artículo muestra que este principio no implica las instancias problemáticas del original principio irres-
tricto de la cognoscibilidad realizable, y que la concepción general que subyace al nuevo principio todavía tiene 
consecuencias epistémicas irrestrictas. Apelando precisamente a la paradoja de la cognoscibilidad, el artículo 
argumenta además, en contra de la semántica BHK, a favor del carácter no constructivo de las demostraciones 
que contempla el anti-realismo semántico, y defiende que, en ese marco, uno de los argumentos más naturales a 
favor de una revisión a grandes rasgos intuicionista de la lógica clásica pierde toda su fuerza.
Palabras clave: composicionalidad, demostración, intuicionismo, conocimiento, manifestación, paradoja de la cognoscibi-
lidad, anti-realismo semántico, verdad.
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1. Semantic Anti-Realism
Semantic anti-realism (henceforth simply ‘anti-realism’) is the doctrine that there is a con-
ceptual connection between truth and our recognition of it. As qualifiedly applying to a partic-
ular discourse D, anti-realism is the doctrine that there is a conceptual connection between 
the truth of sentences belonging to D and our recognition of it.1 Henceforth assuming a 
suitably simplified version of English to be the language used by the discourse in question, 
this conceptual connection has typically been supposed to be captured by the formulation 
of an epistemic constraint on the notion of truth operating over the discourse, in particular 
by the principle of feasible knowability of truth:
(TFPK) If ‘P’ is true, it is feasibly knowable that P,
where the substitution class of the substitutional variable ‘P’ will henceforth be understood 
to be restricted to sentences supposed to be included in the scope of the relevant form of 
anti-realism, and where it will henceforth be left to context to disambiguate exactly which 
quotation environment is activated by single quotation marks (for example, in the case of 
(TFPK) quotation marks activate an autonymous quotation environment).2
Three features usually associated with the modal epistemic operator ‘it is feasibly know-
able that’ are worth remarking upon right at the outset. Firstly, the operator is intended to 
be factive in the sense that its being feasibly knowable that P entails that P (call this ‘the fac-
tivity constraint’).3 Secondly, that the knowability in question is a feasible one means that 
1  Call the unqualified form of anti-realism, applying to whichever discourse, ‘global anti-realism’. Call 
a qualified form of anti-realism, applying only to a particular discourse D, ‘local anti-realism with re-
spect to D’. Henceforth assuming that sentences talking about knowledge concerning a certain discourse 
themselves belong to that discourse, the discussion of this paper is insensitive to the distinction be-
tween global and local anti-realism.
2  Notice that, throughout, expressions will be individuated in such a way as to make redundant the 
usual relativization to languages of the truth predicate. Moreover, notice that, if we want to preserve 
their disquotational character, (TFPK) and subsequent principles must be restricted to unambiguous 
and non-context-dependent sentences; alternatively, assuming context also to resolve ambiguity ‘true’ 
and its like must be replaced by ‘true-in-the-present-context’ and its like (see e.g. Zardini [2008], pp. 
550-561; Zardini [2012a]; Zardini [2015a], pp. 49-52 for discussions of the damning effects of con-
text dependence on disquotational principles of all kinds). For ease of discussion, I will henceforth 
ignore ambiguity and context dependence. Furthermore, notice that, throughout, one can replace 
substitutional quantification with, roughly, propositional quantification restricted to propositions ex-
pressed by sentences of English (plus further restrictions that may be operative at the relevant pas-
sage). Less restricted feasible-knowability principles using propositional quantification are also in 
themselves interesting, but are not directly relevant for the topic of this paper, whose foundations lie 
in what understanding an expression ultimately consists in. Finally, notice that, although in general an 
epistemic constraint need not go the other way too (consider for example a principle to the effect that 
truth only requires the existence of some evidence), all the specific epistemic constraints considered in 
this paper use notions that are strong enough to guarantee that their converse directions hold too (al-
though I will not usually make this explicit). Thanks to Gabriel Uzquiano for discussion of some of 
these points.
3  Throughout, I will not essentially presuppose any particular semantic structure in the operator ‘it is fea-
sibly knowable that’ and in its like. I should note though that it is an appealing idea to treat feasible 
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the relevant possible situations witness to a claim of feasible knowability are situations con-
cerning beings endowed with our actual cognitive powers or, at most, with some finite ex-
tensions thereof (call this ‘the finitude constraint’).4 Thirdly, that the knowability in ques-
tion is a feasible one means that the relevant possible situations witness to a claim of feasible 
knowability are situations in which the available evidence is constrained by the present state 
of the actual world—that is, by the state at which the claim of feasible knowability is to be 
evaluated (call this ‘the accessibility constraint’).5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a particular, unre-
stricted form of anti-realism and a problem posed to it by a well-known reasoning, the par-
adox of knowability. Section 3 offers a reconstruction of an influential argument from un-
derstanding, yielding, for semantically simple sentences, the (TFPK)-version of anti-realism. 
Sections 4 and 5 develop the argument further with respect to semantically complex sen-
tences, yielding, for sentences in general, a different version of unrestricted anti-realism to the 
effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. Section 6 shows 
that that principle fails to imply the problematic instances of (TFPK) but that the overall 
view underlying the new principle still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing 
precisely to the paradox of knowability, section 7 argues, against the BHK semantics, for the 
non-constructive character of the demonstrations envisaged by anti-realism, and contends 
that, in such setting, one of the most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision of 
classical logic loses all its force.
2. The Paradox of Knowability
Unrestricted anti-realism is the doctrine that, whichever principle (such as (TFPK)) is epis-
temically to constrain the truth of sentences belonging to a discourse, every instance of it 
holds.6 Under some natural assumptions, the (TFPK)-version of unrestricted anti-realism 
knowability as some sort of possibility of knowledge, even though carrying out such idea in detail is no 
trivial task, especially insofar as satisfying the factivity constraint is concerned, given that possibility is 
not in general factive (see Zardini [2007]; [2012b]; [2015c] for discussion of some of the difficulties in-
volved). Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging this clarification.
4 I myself am no friend of such and similar constraints (see fn 34 and Zardini [2015b] for some discus-
sion), but I will typically assume it to dispel the likely impression that the view developed in this paper 
is incompatible with it. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to be more explicit about this.
5 To clarify, the cash value of the accessibility constraint is supposed to be that, if it is feasibly knowable 
that P, it can be known that P by relying only on something that is present and accessible in the actual 
world at the present time. That plausibly implies, for example, that only extant records are admissible ev-
idence for evaluating the feasible knowability of facts concerning the past. The accessibility constraint 
is thus more controversial than the factivity or finitude constraint (see Dummett [1969] for a seminal 
discussion). But, as we will see, it is a natural component of the view developed in this paper; moreover, 
it is worthwhile showing that the relevant form of anti-realism can be stabilized even under its assump-
tion. Thanks to an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier version of the material concerning 
the accessibility constraint.
6 Notice that the distinction between unrestricted and restricted anti-realism is orthogonal to the dis-
tinction between global and local anti-realism (see fn 1). Notice also that the (TFPK)-version of un-
restricted anti-realism (and, more generally, similarly disquotational versions of unrestricted anti-real-
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is refuted by the following simple reasoning, originally published in Fitch [1963], pp. 138-
139 (but most likely due to Alonzo Church, see Salerno [2009], pp. 34-37) and known as 
‘the paradox of knowability’.
Start with the assumption that it is known7 that [P and it is not known that P].8 
Then, by distribution of knowledge over conjunction, it is known [that P] and it is known 
that it is not known that P. By simplification on the first conjunct, it is known that P. By 
simplification on the second conjunct, it is known that it is not known that P. By factivity 
of knowledge, it is not known that P. Contradiction. By reductio, it is not known that [P 
and it is not known that P]. By necessitation, necessarily, it is not known that [P and it is 
not known that P]. Given that metaphysical necessity (of ignorance) entails feasible neces-
sity (of ignorance), and therefore the negation of feasible possibility (of knowledge), this 
result, together with the contraposed (TFPK)-version of unrestricted anti-realism, entails 
that ‘P and it is not known that P’ is untrue. Together with the principle of disquotation 
for truth:
(DT) ‘P’ is true iff P,
this yields in turn the result that there are no unknown truths.9
ism, see fn 2) might need some restriction at least on some approaches to the semantic paradoxes (but 
not on mine, see e.g. Zardini [2011]). (This seems overlooked by Kallestrup [2007], who oddly seems 
to take the ensuing epistemic paradox straightforwardly to refute unrestricted anti-realism. The odd-
ity is brought out, for example, by the fact that, within his overall argument, Kallestrup accepts a sub-
argument which does not rely on anti-realism and whose conclusion —which he presumably regards as 
proved— is a sentence saying of itself that it is unknowable. Kallestrup’s argument is inspired by Milne 
[2007], in turn inspired by Milne [2005]. The whole style of argument is criticized by López de Sa and 
Zardini [2006]; [2007]; [2011]; Zardini [2015d].) Although it is unclear to me, in case such restric-
tion were indeed needed, exactly what if any substantially new problem for the relevant version of un-
restricted anti-realism would be posed by the considerations presented in this section, I will henceforth 
ignore the semantic paradoxes.
7  Throughout, read ‘it is known that’ and its relatives as implicitly existentially quantifying over subjects 
and times.
8 Throughout, I use square brackets to disambiguate constituent structure in English.
9  Use the contraposed right-to-left direction of (DT) to go from the untruth of ‘P and it is not known 
that P’ to its negation; use the left-to-right direction of (DT) to go from there to the negation of ‘‘P’ 
is true and it is not known that P’; use substitutional universal generalization to go from there to eve-
rything being not both true and unknown. Using an appropriate natural-deduction system, the whole 
reasoning can be formalized thus:
 1   (1) stKs,t(P ∧ stKs,t P) assumption
 1   (2) stKs,t P ∧ stKs,tstKs,t P  1 stKs,t -distribution
 1   (3) stKs,t P 2 simplification
 1   (4) stKs,t stKs,t P  2 simplification
 1   (5) stKs,t P  4 stKs,t-factivity
   (6) stKs,t(P ∧ stKs,t P) 3,5 reductio
   (7) stKs,t(P ∧ stKs,t P) 6 -necessitation
   (8) ■stKs,t(P ∧ stKs,t P) 7 φ  ■φ
   (9) ♦stKs,t(P ∧ stKs,t P) 8 ■φ  ♦φ
  (10) T‘P ∧ stKs,t P’ 9 (TFPK)
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Classically, this result is equivalent to every truth’s being known. If you accept classi-
cal logic and think that it is not the case that every truth is known, you had better reject the 
(TFPK)-version of unrestricted anti-realism. If you accept intuitionist logic and think that 
there are unknown truths, you too had better reject the (TFPK)-version of unrestricted 
anti-realism (and you had better reject it even if you only accept the intuitionistically 
weaker claim that it is not the case that there are no unknown truths).10
Should we take the foregoing reasoning to give us reasons for disbelieving unre-
stricted anti-realism in general? No, for there is at least one way of reconstructing what 
the advertized connection between truth and our recognition of it consists in which 
yields a principle different from (TFPK) and a version of unrestricted anti-realism 
which, contrary to the (TFPK)-version, does not fall prey to the paradox of knowability, 
or so I shall argue.
3. Anti-Realism and Manifestation
One major line of argument for anti-realism, taking its lead from the theory of understand-
ing, runs like this.11 What does understanding an expression ultimately consist in? In some 
ability or other to use the expression,12 otherwise understanding would be an utterly myste-
  (11) (P ∧ stKs,t P) 10 -direction of (DT)
  (12) (T‘P’ ∧ stKs,t P) 11 -direction of (DT)
  (13) ΠP(T‘P’ ∧ stKs,t P) 12 substitutional universal generalization
  (14) ΣP(T‘P’ ∧ stKs,t P) 13 Πεφ  Σεφ,
00  where Kτ0 , τ1φ formalizes ‘τ0 knows at τ1 that φ’, and ■ and ♦ are operators of feasible necessity and fea-
sible possibility respectively.
10  Williamson [1982] would have an anti-realist swallow the pill and accept that that there are no un-
known truths. Setting aside more obvious problems, I argue in Zardini [2015e] that Williamson’s pro-
posal is unstable.
11  What follows is obviously very much inspired by Dummett’s works (see e.g. Dummett [1975]), in turn 
broadly influenced by the later Wittgenstein’s reflections on meaning and use (see e.g. Wittgenstein 
[1953]), although I certainly do not wish to claim that the detailed way in which I put the argument 
is completely faithful to Dummett’s own thinking, let alone Wittgenstein’s. To make sure you don’t 
quote me on that, I stress that I myself remain neutral about the soundness of the argument in its gen-
erality, although I do find it attractive at least as far as certain kinds of expressions are concerned (for 
example, observational predicates like ‘red’, ‘heap’, ‘feels cold’ etc.). I am not neutral however about its 
interest, and that’s why I wrote this paper.
12  The important and widespread phenomenon of semantic deference can safely be ignored in this con-
text, as we can restrict our attention to the non-deferring speakers competent with the expression. 
Clearly, whatever conclusion we reach concerning the relevant language will also hold for the language 
spoken by the deferring speakers, as the “languages” in question are one and the same, at least under a 
semantic-deference thesis strong enough to call in the first place for a restriction of the argument in 
the text (see Burge [1979] for a seminal paper on semantic deference and Williamson [2003] for a re-
cent emphasis broadly related to some of the issues discussed in this paper; I do not see that much re-
mains of Williamson’s semantic-deference-based attack on inferentialism once attention is restricted 
to non-deferring speakers, as it is certainly legitimate to do for inferentialism at least as motivated by 
the theory of understanding).
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rious capacity for beings like us to have. For what else could its basis be, since there clearly 
must be one? How else would it be possible to assess whether it is present or not, as we 
clearly do? How else would it be possible for it to be transmissible, as it clearly is? Although 
an adequate development of these considerations lies beyond the scope of this paper, let us 
then assume a manifestation constraint on understanding: whatever understanding of an ex-
pression a speaker has, she must manifest it in her use of the expression.13
Now, one use expressions are typically put to is assertion (whatever that exactly is): 
so we may ask what can be manifested by a participant in such use. On the one hand, we 
should all agree that assertion is a norm-governed practice in at least the following, rather 
minimal, sense: assertions are warranted by and in turn warrant certain things. Hence-
forth, focus on the input side of assertion,14 and, in this section, focus on the atomic sen-
tences of the language, henceforth understanding these not to have semantically signifi-
cant constituents (and so to be broadly akin to ‘It’s raining’ rather than to ‘João walks’). 
A speaker manifests her taking the world’s being W to warrant an assertion of an atomic 
13 Thanks to an anonymous referee for feedback that led to improvements in this paragraph.
14  It is essential to distinguish two different kinds of warrant for an assertion: objective warrant — 
that which makes an assertion at least partially correct independently of the speaker’s point of view 
— and subjective warrant —that which makes an assertion at least partially correct from the speak-
er’s point of view. For example, on the one hand, the world’s being such that, say, under certain con-
ditions glass would break is an objective warrant for an assertion of ‘Glass is fragile’: independently 
of the speaker’s point of view, such assertion is at least partially correct in a way that it would not 
be if it were not the case that, under certain conditions, glass would break. On the other hand, the 
world’s being such that the speaker has some evidence that, under certain conditions, glass would 
break is a subjective warrant for an assertion of ‘Glass is fragile’: from her point of view, such asser-
tion is at least partially correct in a way that it would not be if she did not have such evidence. To 
go back to an issue emerged in fn 11, the same contrast occurs with more observational predicates 
like ‘red’. If, as we are about to see in the text, the practice of assertion is so constituted that noth-
ing over and above a speaker’s taking the world’s being in a certain way to be a necessary or suffi-
cient condition for an assertion of a certain sentence to be warranted can be manifested in it, and 
if, by the manifestation constraint on understanding, a speaker only understands what she mani-
fests, if the necessary and sufficient condition for an assertion of ‘Tomato sauce is red’ to be war-
ranted were that tomato sauce looks red to the speaker, it would very implausibly follow that the 
speaker understands ‘Tomato sauce is red’ as saying that tomato sauce looks red to her, whereas 
she very plausibly has a conception of the difference between tomato sauce’s being red and tomato 
sauce’s looking red to her. Observational predicates like ‘red’ still draw at least this kind of distinc-
tion between reality and appearance, and, on the view developed in this paper, to account for this 
it is sufficient that the world’s being such that, say, under certain conditions tomato sauce would 
look red to the speaker is an objective warrant for an assertion of ‘Tomato sauce is red’ (the world’s 
being such that the speaker has some evidence that, under certain conditions, tomato sauce would 
look red — for example, by being such that tomato sauce looks red to her — would then be a sub-
jective warrant for an assertion of ‘Tomato sauce is red’). (I emphasize once and for all that I am 
not committed to such “counterfactual analyses”: I use them simply because they are easy to work 
with and go in the right direction as far as the relevant issues about objectivity are concerned.) 
Looking red to the speaker can play a crucial role in the meaning of ‘red’ without the latter being 
reduced to the former (see section 6 for more on objectivity). Henceforth, focus on objective war-
rant (henceforth simply ‘warrant’).
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sentence α by and only by being disposed ([under extension15 and presentation] concerning 
the world’s being W)16 to [assert α if the world is W].17 Conversely, a speaker manifests 
her taking an assertion of α to be warranted only by the world’s being W by and only by 
being disposed (under ideal conditions)18 to [assert α only if the world is W]. This much 
she can do. But, crucially, this much is also all she can do: the practice of assertion is so 
constituted that nothing over and above a speaker’s taking the world’s being in a certain 
way to be a necessary or sufficient condition for an assertion of a certain sentence to be 
warranted can be manifested in it.
To take the world’s being W to be the necessary and sufficient condition for an as-
sertion of an atomic sentence α to be warranted thus requires being disposed (under ideal 
conditions) to [assert α iff the world is W]. But that disposition in turn requires the dis-
position (under ideal conditions) to [believe that the world is W iff the world is W]—
otherwise, either there would be a possible situation (under ideal conditions) in which 
the world is W but the speaker does not believe it to be W (and so does not assert α) or a 
possible situation (under ideal conditions) in which the world is not W but she believes 
it to be W (and so asserts α). I assume that the latter disposition suffices for the disposi-
tion (under ideal conditions) to know whether the world is W.19 Given the further as-
sumption that ideal conditions are compatible with the world’s being W, it follows that, 
if the world is W, it is feasibly knowable that the world is W, since the antecedent of this 
conditional satisfies the factivity constraint, the envisaged kind of extensions satisfy the 
15  The notion of extension in question relates to the one explicated in relation to the finitude constraint 
and additionally allows for the relevant finite extension to perform the relevant computations.
16  The notion of presentation in question is such that a presentation is made to a speaker concerning 
an object’s being F iff there is no better epistemic position the speaker could be in in order to deter-
mine of the object whether it is F, where the range of candidate epistemic positions is subject to the 
accessibility constraint. I assume suitable constraints on the de re attitude expressed by ‘determine 
of the object whether it is F’, so that, for example, accepting that the saliently F object, if it exists, is 
F is not a way of holding that attitude. Thanks to Gabriel Uzquiano for pressing me to be more ex-
plicit about this.
17  Throughout, what I mean by this and similar constructions is, splitting my infinitives and italicizing 
square brackets, that the speaker actually and presently is disposed to, [under certain conditions, do 
certain things].
18  When it is contextually clear what is presented, I will henceforth say ‘under ideal conditions’ instead of 
‘[under extension and presentation] concerning ...’.
19  The assumption boils down to the assumption that tracking whether P (in the sense made explicit in 
the text) is sufficient for knowledge whether P. The assumption is far more plausible than the con-
verse assumption that tracking whether P is necessary for knowledge whether P. The assumption is 
most likely still subject to boring counterexamples relating to the possible presence of defeaters and 
the like, but it is extremely plausible that, while these are counterexamples to the current claim of dis-
position to know, they are not counterexamples to the claim of feasible knowability that I am about to 
draw from it in the text: in other words, it is extremely plausible that the counterexamples are, as it 
were, wiped out in the move from the stronger claim of disposition to know to the weaker claim of fea-
sible knowability.
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finitude constraint (see fn 15) and the envisaged kind of presentations satisfy the accessi-
bility constraint (see fn 16).20
On the other hand (the first one going back to the second sentence of the second last 
paragraph!), we should all also agree that assertion is a world-directed practice: assertions 
represent the world as being in a certain way and are evaluated accordingly. For example, 
whether snow is white or not is in this sense always relevant to the evaluation of an asser-
tion of ‘Snow is white’. And it would seem that this is so because that snow is white is what 
‘Snow is white’says. If ‘Snow is white’did not say that snow is white (or something related), 
it would be hard to see how whether snow is white or not could still be in this sense always 
relevant for the evaluation of an assertion of ‘Snow is white’. The dimension of evaluation 
in question, connecting the status of an asserted sentence with the way the world is and the 
way the sentence says it is, is best identified with the one of truth, given the compellingness 
of the principle about truth and saying:
(TS) For every P, ‘P’ is true iff the world is the way ‘P’ says it is.
But what a sentence ‘P’ says cannot outrun what a competent speaker understands it to 
say. And, by the manifestation constraint on understanding, what a competent speaker 
understands ‘P’ to say is something she manifests in the practice of assertion. Since, as we 
have seen in the third last paragraph, all a speaker can manifest in the practice of assertion 
is what she takes to warrant an assertion of ‘P’ (say, the world’s being W), the world is the 
way ‘P’ says it is iff it is W.21,22 But, by the argument in the third and second last paragraphs, 
20  The argument in the text can be represented thus:
 ii(i).  A speaker manifests her taking the world’s being W to be the necessary and sufficient condition for 
an assertion of an atomic sentence α to be warranted by and only by being disposed (under ideal 
conditions) to [assert α iff the world is W]. (What can be manifested in the practice of assertion.)
 i(ii).  That disposition ultimately requires the disposition (under ideal conditions) to know whether 
the world is W. (Tracking suffices for knowledge.)
 (iii).  And that disposition implies that there is a possible situation (under ideal conditions) in which the 
speaker knows that the world is W. (Ideal conditions are compatible with the world’s being W.)
 (iv).  Therefore, provided that the speaker manifests her taking the world’s being W to be the neces-
sary and sufficient condition for an assertion of α to be warranted, if the world is W it is feasibly 
knowable that the world is W. (From (i), (ii) and (iii) given that the factivity, finitude and acces-
sibility constraints are satisfied.)
21  Equivalence in ‘say that’-contexts is notoriously a highly controversial matter. But, even if it turns out 
that ‘P’ does not say that the world is W, what it says is something which is in some sense analytically 
equivalent with the world’s being W (the sense relating what a sentence says with what it is understood 
to say by a competent speaker), and that is sufficient to validate the claim in the text that the world is 
the way ‘P’ says it is iff it is W.
22  Notice that we have just concluded that the world’s being W is in a very strong sense (the one men-
tioned in fn 21) a sufficient condition for its being the way ‘P’ says it is, and so that the world’s being 
W is a conclusive warrant for an assertion of ‘P’. Thus, when motivated along the lines of the argument 
in this paper (with its assumption of very tight saying-understanding-manifestation-warrant connec-
tions), anti-realism requires conclusive warrants in every discourse to which it applies (rather than, 
contrary to a common way of thinking, requiring conclusive warrants only in mathematical discourse 
and its like and merely defeasible warrants in empirical discourses). (Fn 14 in effect exploits the same 
connections to motivate an objective notion of warrant.)
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henceforth assuming at the relevant places that ‘P’ is atomic, if the world is W, it is feasibly 
knowable that the world is W, and, given a highly plausible principle of closure of feasible 
knowability under analytic equivalence (see fn 21), if it is feasibly knowable that the world is 
W what ‘P’ says is feasibly knowably the case. Therefore, if what ‘P’ says is the case, it is fea-
sibly knowable that it is the case. Given (TS) and the principle of disquotation for sentences’ 
saying:
(DSS) What ‘P’ says is that P,23
we finally have that, if ‘P’ is true, it is feasibly knowable that P —that is, (TFPK) restricted 
to atomic sentences.24
4. Compositionality and Demonstration
You may think that, given what we have seen in section 2, something must have gone ter-
ribly wrong somewhere in section 3. Not so. The argument in section 3 is fine as far as it 
goes, as it only establishes (TFPK) restricted to atomic sentences, while it is arguably crucial 
for the paradox of knowability that (TFPK) includes in its scope semantically complex sen-
tences. Granted, one might try to stipulate a complex meaning for a syntactically simple —i.e. 
atomic— sentence. In particular, one might try to stipulate, for some (without loss of gen-
erality) semantically simple P, that a certain atomic sentence β says that [P and it is not 
known that P]. But this attempt would be both problematic and futile. The attempt would 
be problematic because, under ideal conditions, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
an assertion of β to be warranted would not hold (since, essentially by the argument in 
section 3, under ideal conditions, if P, the speaker knows that P). But, assuming that it is 
possible that the world is W,25 it is plausible to maintain that a speaker manifests her tak-
ing the world’s being W to be the necessary and sufficient condition for an assertion of an 
atomic sentence α to be warranted only if, under ideal conditions, her assertions genuinely 
track the world’s being W in the sense that, in some possible situation (under ideal condi-
tions), it is the case that [she asserts α iff the world is W] because both she asserts α and the 
23  Notice that (TS) and (DSS) together entail (and arguably ground) (DT).
24  The argument in the text can be represented thus:
 II(I).  What a sentence ‘P’ says cannot outrun what a competent speaker understands it to say. (Con-
nection between saying und understanding.)
 I(II).  Hence, since all a speaker can manifest in the practice of assertion is what she takes to warrant 
an assertion of ‘P’ (say, the world’s being W), the world is the way ‘P’ says it is iff it is W. (From 
(I) and the manifestation constraint on understanding.)
 (III).  If the world is W, it is feasibly knowable that the world is W. (From (iv) in fn 20.)
 (IV).  Hence, if what ‘P’ says is the case, it is feasibly knowable that it is the case. (From (II) and (III) 
by closure of feasible knowability under analytic equivalence.)
 I(V).  Therefore, if ‘P’ is true, it is feasibly knowable that P. (From (IV), (TS) and (DSS).)
25  As, in the offending cases, we evidently may, on pain of ending up independently validating the inter-
mediate conclusion of the Church-Fitch reasoning to the effect that it is not the case that [P and it is 
not known that P].
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world is W (rather than its being the case that, in every possible situation (under ideal con-
ditions), it is the case that [she asserts α iff the world is W] because neither does she assert 
α nor is the world W, as it would happen in the case of β). The attempt would be futile be-
cause, in any event, the argument in section 3 crucially relied on the assumption that ideal 
conditions are compatible with the world’s being W, an assumption that, while compelling 
for semantically simple sentences, as we have just observed fails in the case of the necessary 
and sufficient condition for an assertion of β to be warranted.
Moving on to compound sentences, the general idea is that, by the principle of composi-
tionality, understanding a compound sentence, contrary to understanding an atomic one, 
simply consists in understanding its components (plus, of course, their modes of compo-
sition). There should be no immediate requirement that understanding a compound sen-
tence requires being disposed (under ideal conditions) to [assert the sentence iff the world 
is in a certain way], for that would amount to treating compound sentences as though they 
were atomic, with no semantically significant parts on which understanding can build. 
That a speaker takes the world’s being W to be the necessary and sufficient condition for 
an assertion of a compound sentence φ to be warranted is determined by her understanding 
of φ’s component expressions, not by her being disposed (under ideal conditions) to [assert 
φ iff the world is W].
For our purposes, we can focus on a simple standard first-order epistemic language 
without identity and with only general terms of arbitrary arity as its non-logical con-
stants.26 From the point of view which sees assertion as a norm-governed practice, the basic 
notion will now be the notion of an application of a formula27 to certain objects being war-
ranted by certain facts. The practice of assertion is so constituted that nothing over and 
above a speaker’s disposition to take certain objects’ being in a certain way to be the neces-
sary or sufficient condition for an application of a certain formula to them to be warranted 
can be manifested in it.
Start with atomic formulae. A speaker manifests her taking a sequence of objects28 be-
ing W to warrant application of an atomic formula φ(ξ) to it (where φ(ξ) and its like are 
formulae that may be open in several variables) by and only by being disposed ([under ex-
tension and presentation] concerning the sequence’s being W) to [apply φ(ξ) to the se-
quence if the sequence is W]. Conversely, a speaker manifests her taking an application of 
an atomic formula φ(ξ) to a sequence to be warranted only by the sequence’s being W by 
and only by being disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply φ(ξ) to the sequence only 
if the sequence is W]. The considerations in section 3 linking manifesting one’s taking 
26  I do not consider usual logical expressive resources going beyond such language simply because they do 
not pose additional problems in relation to the issues raised by the paradox of knowability. It should 
be clear from what follows how to treat, for example, identity predicates, absurdity constants or possi-
bility operators; as for singular terms, their introduction would be unproblematic and would go along 
the main lines of what follows, but would require bringing into play new, dedicated notions at the level 
of speech acts, warrant, meaning and semantic evaluation. Thanks to Gabriel Uzquiano for urging 
these clarifications.
27  I understand formulae so that they differ from sentences in that they might contain free variables.
28  Throughout, I assume that the language has denumerably many variables and focus on ω-long se-
quences (you can think of each such sequence as an assignment of objects to the variables of the lan-
guage).
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something to warrant something, dispositions and knowledge require then the disposition 
(under ideal conditions) to know whether the sequence is W. Given the further assump-
tion that ideal conditions are compatible with the sequence’s being W,29 it follows that, if 
the sequence is W, it is feasibly knowable that the sequence is W, since the antecedent of 
this conditional satisfies the factivity constraint, the envisaged kind of extensions satisfy 
the finitude constraint (see fn 15) and the envisaged kind of presentations satisfy the ac-
cessibility constraint (see fn 16).30
Say that a sequence permonstrates a formula φ(ξ) iff the application of φ(ξ) to it is war-
ranted. Enter then logical operators. They form more complex formulae out of simpler ones, 
the permonstration condition of the compound formula being a function of the permon-
stration conditions of its components (I will briefly discuss and criticize in section 7 a view 
on which there is no such functionality). A speaker’s taking it that the operation character-
istic of an nary logical operator Ω is a certain function will (very plausibly) be manifested 
by and only by her being disposed ([under extension and presentation] concerning the 
permonstration conditions of φ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) by a sequence) to [apply Ωφ0(ξ0), 
φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) to the sequence so that such application is an isomorphic function of her 
applications of φ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) to it].
Let us see how this plays out in detail for the usual logical operators. A speaker may be 
disposed ([under extension and presentation] concerning the permonstration conditions 
of φ(ξ0) and ψ(ξ1) by a sequence) to [apply φ(ξ0) ∧ ψ(ξ1) to the sequence iff she applies φ(ξ0) 
to it and applies ψ(ξ1) to it]. She thereby manifests her taking a sequence permonstrat-
ing φ(ξ0) and permonstrating ψ(ξ1) to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the se-
quence to permonstrate φ(ξ0) ∧ ψ(ξ1).
29  For the reason brought out by the paradox of knowability, given rich enough ontology and ideology the 
assumption will not always be satisfied. For example, ideal conditions are not compatible with the fact 
that [there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews and it is not known that there 1,963 trees in St Andrews] ex-
isting, with the sentence ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews and it is not known that there 1,963 trees 
in St Andrews’ being true or with 1,963 belonging to the set {n: There are n trees in St Andrews and it 
is not known that there n trees in St Andrews}. Having noted this, since the existence of these and sim-
ilar cases does not alter the substance of the view developed in this paper I will henceforth assume such 
compatibility. Thanks to Gabriel Uzquiano for questions that prompted this fn.
30  The argument in the text can be represented thus:
 ii(i’).  A speaker manifests her taking a sequence’s being W to be the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for an application of an atomic formula φ(ξ) to it to be warranted by and only by being dis-
posed (under ideal conditions) to [apply φ(ξ) to the sequence iff the sequence is W]. (What can 
be manifested in the practice of assertion.)
 i(ii’).  That disposition ultimately requires the disposition (under ideal conditions) to know whether 
the sequence is W. (Tracking suffices for knowledge.)
 (iii’).  And that disposition implies that there is a possible situation (under ideal conditions) in which 
the speaker knows that the sequence is W. (Ideal conditions are compatible with the sequence’s 
being W.)
 (iv’).  Therefore, provided that the speaker manifests her taking the sequence’s being W to be the nec-
essary and sufficient condition for an application of φ(ξ) to it to be warranted, if the sequence is 
W it is feasibly knowable that the sequence is W. (From (i’), (ii’) and (iii’) given that the factiv-
ity, finitude and accessibility constraints are satisfied.)
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A speaker may be disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply φ(ξ0) ∨ ψ(ξ1) to a se-
quence iff she applies φ(ξ0) to it or applies ψ(ξ1) to it].31 She thereby manifests her taking a 
sequence permonstrating φ(ξ0) or permonstrating ψ(ξ1) to be the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the sequence to permonstrate φ(ξ0) ∨ ψ(ξ1).
A speaker may be disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply φ(ξ0)  ψ(ξ1) to a se-
quence iff, if she applies φ(ξ0) to it, then she applies ψ(ξ1) to it].32 She thereby manifests her 
taking a sequence permonstrating ψ(ξ1) if it permonstrates φ(ξ0) to be the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the sequence to permonstrate φ(ξ0)  ψ(ξ1).
A speaker may be disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply φ(ξ) to a sequence iff 
she does not apply φ(ξ) to it].33 She thereby manifests her taking a sequence not permon-
strating φ(ξ) to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence to permonstrate 
φ(ξ).
A speaker may be disposed ([under extension and presentation] concerning the permon-
stration conditions of φ(ξ1) by a sequence and by every relevant sequence differing from it at 
most at its ξ0-corresponding coordinate) to [apply ξ0φ(ξ1) to the original sequence iff, for 
every relevant sequence differing from the original sequence at most at its ξ0-corresponding 
coordinate, she applies φ(ξ1) to it].34 She thereby manifests her taking a sequence to be such 
31  It is uncontroversial that, under non-ideal conditions, a speaker might apply φ(ξ0) ∨ ψ(ξ1) to a sequence 
without either applying φ(ξ0) to it or applying ψ(ξ1) to it (for example, she might apply ‘x is either di-
visible by 2 or the successor of a number divisible by 2’ to 1,963 merely on the ground of an inductive 
proof of ‘Every number is either divisible by 2 or the successor of a number divisible by 2’). But the 
possible situations (under non-ideal conditions) that uncontroversially witness such pattern of ap-
plication are situations in which she nevertheless possesses a procedure whose implementation either 
would allow her to apply φ(ξ0) to the sequence or would allow her to apply ψ(ξ1) to it. Under ideal con-
ditions, such procedure would be implemented.
32  By the properties of material ‘If..., then...’, provided that a speaker does not apply φ(ξ0) to a sequence 
it follows that, if she applies φ(ξ0) to it, then she applies ψ(ξ1) to it. Of course, under non-ideal con-
ditions, it would be crazy for her to apply φ(ξ0) ⊃ ψ(ξ1) to it simply because she does not apply φ(ξ0) 
to it. But what would be epistemic hubris under non-ideal conditions is not such under ideal condi-
tions.
33  Similarly to what was observed in fn 32, of course, under non-ideal conditions, it would be crazy for a 
speaker to apply φ(ξ) to a sequence simply because she does not apply φ(ξ) to it. But what would be 
epistemic hubris under non-ideal conditions is not such under ideal conditions.
34  Throughout, I use ‘apply’ and its relatives in a suitably dispositional sense, so that a finite being, even 
though not capable of infinitely many occurring judgements at the same time, is indeed capable of in-
finitely many standing applications at the same time, and also so that such being can apply a formula 
to an object without being able to single out that object (see Zardini [2015a], p. 41, fn 9, p. 43, fn 13; 
[2015b] for some more relevant discussion). Such dispositions, when present, are typically grounded in 
possession of some sort of “proof”, for every relevant object, that it is in a certain way (in the very weak 
sense that one possesses a form of ground that one in principle knows how, and so is disposed, to apply 
occurrently to each object to produce a specific ground for that object). Thus, for example, I do apply 
‘x is either divisible by 2 or the successor of a number divisible by 2’ to all the infinitely many numbers, 
and I do so because I possess a proof, for every number, that it is either divisible by 2 or the successor of 
a number divisible by 2. Indeed, to fix ideas, I will henceforth assume that, in the infinite case, the rele-
vant dispositions must be grounded in possession of some sort of “proof”. Given this, the mathematical 
platonist’s dream that, for some formula φ(ξ), every relevant sequence permonstrates φ(ξ) without there 
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that every relevant sequence differing from it at most at its ξ0-corresponding coordinate per-
monstrates φ(ξ1) to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence to permon-
strate ξ0φ(ξ1).
A speaker may be disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply ξ0φ(ξ1) to a sequence iff, 
for some relevant sequence differing from the original sequence at most at its ξ0-corresponding 
coordinate, she applies φ(ξ1) to it]. She thereby manifests her taking a sequence to be such that 
some relevant sequence differing from it at most at its ξ0-corresponding coordinate permon-
strates φ(ξ1) to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence to permonstrate 
ξ0φ(ξ1).
As for K, it is more natural to treat it as a non-logical operator in the sense of treating 
K-initial formulae similarly to how atomic formulae are treated. Thus, a speaker may be 
disposed ([under extension and presentation] concerning whether a sequence’s value for ξ0 
at the sequence’s value for ξ1 knows φ(ξ2) relative to the sequence)35 to [apply Kξ0,ξ1φ(ξ2) to 
the sequence iff the sequence’s value for ξ0 at the sequence’s value for ξ1 knows φ(ξ2)]. She 
thereby manifests her taking a sequence’s value for ξ0 at the sequence’s value for ξ1 know-
ing φ(ξ2) to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence to permonstrate 
Kξ0,ξ1φ(ξ2).
Finally, say that there is a demonstration of a sentence φ (see fn 27) iff φ is permon-
strated by some (every) sequence. It follows that there is a demonstration of φ ∧ ψ iff there 
is a demonstration of φ and a demonstration of ψ; that there is a demonstration of φ ∨ ψ 
iff there is a demonstration of φ or a demonstration of ψ; that there is a demonstration of 
φ  ψ iff, if there is a demonstration of φ, then there is a demonstration of ψ; that there is 
a demonstration of φ iff there is no demonstration of φ; that there is a demonstration of 
being any sort of “proof” of ξφ(ξ) implies that, in every such case, conditions cannot be ideal for appli-
cations of φ(ξ) to every relevant sequence, as that would require performing infinitely many computa-
tions, thereby leading to a violation of the finitude constraint. On the view developed in this paper, the 
fact that conditions cannot be ideal for applications of φ(ξ) to every relevant sequence is no more prob-
lematic for understanding ξφ(ξ) than the fact that conditions cannot be ideal for assertions of both 
conjuncts of a Church-Fitch sentence is for understanding that sentence (as I will discuss in more de-
tail in section 6): in both cases, a speaker can non-vacuously manifest her understanding of the relevant 
logical operator in relation to many other component formulae (indeed, in the case of ξφ(ξ), contrary 
to the case of a Church-Fitch sentence she can non-vacuously manifest her understanding of  by ap-
plying formulae of the same form as φ(ξ) to every relevant sequence!); moreover, since she can unprob-
lematically manifest her understanding of the component formulae, it follows by compositionality that 
she does understand the relevant sentence. Keep dreaming. I should add that I find it extremely odd to 
envisage as candidate conditions for some formula only conditions such that in each of them a speaker 
fails to perform a certain relevant (finite) computation. I find it extremely attractive to postulate instead 
that, for every formula, there are conditions in which a speaker does not fail to perform the relevant com-
putations (wasn’t one of the point of idealization to screen off boring issues arising from failures to per-
form relevant computations?). As I have observed, in the cases in which the mathematical platonist’s 
dream comes true, such extremely attractive postulation leads to a violation of the finitude constraint. 
From the point of view of idealization, finitude can thus be nothing less than a defect: removing de-
fects, idealization removes then finitude. But, in this paper (fn 4), I have imposed myself not to follow 
further this train of thought.
35 I will henceforth leave implicit the relativization to sequences of knowledge of formulae.
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ξφ(ξ) iff there is a permonstration of φ(ξ) by every relevant sequence; that there is a dem-
onstration of ξφ(ξ) iff there is a permonstration of φ(ξ) by some relevant sequence.36
5. Demonstration and Truth
From the point of view which sees assertion as a world-directed practice, applications represent 
their objects as being in a certain way and are evaluated accordingly. For example, whether 
snow is white or not is in this sense always relevant to the evaluation of an application of ‘x 
is white’ to it. And it would seem that this is so because, in such application, that it is white 
is what ‘x is white’ says of snow. If the formula did not say of snow that it is white (or some-
thing related), it would be hard to see how whether snow is white or not could still be in this 
sense always relevant for the evaluation of an application of ‘x is white’ to it. The dimension 
of evaluation in question, connecting the status of certain objects relative to a formula ap-
plied to them with the way they are and the way it says they are, is best identified with that of 
satisfaction,37 given the compellingness of the principle about satisfaction and saying:
(SS)  For every formula P(x), a sequence ¡x0, x1, ...° satisfies ‘P(x)’ iff x0, x1, ... are the 
way ‘P(x)’ says they are.
But what a formula ‘P(x)’ says cannot outrun what a competent speaker understands it to 
say. And, by the manifestation constraint on understanding, what a competent speaker 
understands ‘P(x)’ to say is something she manifests in the practice of assertion. Since, as 
we have seen in section 4, all a speaker can manifest in the practice of assertion is what she 
takes to be a permonstration of ‘P(x)’ by a sequence, x0, x1, ... are the way ‘P(x)’ says they are 
iff ¡x0, x1, ...° permonstrates ‘P(x)’.38 By (SS), a sequence satisfies ‘P(x)’ iff it permonstrates 
‘P(x)’.
Now, a formula φ(ξ) is true iff it is a sentence satisfied by some (every) sequence. By the 
argument in the last paragraph, we can then conclude that a formula φ(ξ) is true iff it is a 
36  If the language is enriched with constants for every object of the domain and the definition of dem-
onstration is expanded in a suitable way so as to cover the new set of atomic sentences, the demonstra-
tion functionality of the quantifiers can be restored as follows: there is a demonstration of ξφ(ξ) iff, 
for every constant L, there is a demonstration of φ(L/ξ) (where φ(τ0/τ1) is the result of, under the usual 
proviso, substituting τ0 for the free occurrences of τ1 in φ(τ1)); there is a demonstration of ξφ(ξ) iff, 
for some constant L, there is a demonstration of φ(L/ξ).
37  The intuitive semantic notion here is the one of being true of, whose arity seems to be variable (‘x is a 
football team’ is true of Sporting CP, ‘x is better than y’ is true of Sporting CP and FC Porto in this or-
der). The notion of satisfaction can then be extracted by first forming a 2ary predicate ‘x0 is true* of x1’ 
true of formulae and sequences and then taking its converse.
38  And so, given the principle of disquotation for formulae’s saying:
 (DFS) ‘P(x)’ says of x0, x1, ... that they are P,
00  the corresponding principles of disquotation for permonstration and disquotation for demonstration fol-
low:
0  (DP)  There is a permonstration of ‘P(x)’ by ¡x0, x1, ...° iff x0, x1, ... are P;
0  (DD) There is a demonstration of ‘P’ iff P.
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sentence permonstrated by some (every) sequence —that is, iff there is a demonstration of 
it.39 What the proposed reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from understanding 
yields is thus the principle of demonstration of truth:
(TD) If ‘P’ is true, there is a demonstration of ‘P’.
6. Demonstration and Knowledge
Crucially, the argument in sections 4 and 5 does not discriminate between different kinds 
of sentences, and so (TD) holds unrestrictedly (contrary to other prominent anti-realist re-
actions to the paradox of knowability, which abandon unrestricted anti-realism).40 Does 
the (TD)-version of unrestricted anti-realism fall prey to the paradox of knowability?
To see that this is not the case, return first to the basic notion of a permonstration. A 
speaker manifests her taking a sequence’s being W to permonstrate an atomic formula φ(ξ) by 
and only by being disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply φ(ξ) to the sequence iff the se-
quence is W]. But a sequence permonstrates φ(ξ) iff speakers take it to do so. Therefore, φ(ξ) 
is permonstrated by a sequence iff the sequence is W (rather than “seems to be W”) —where a 
sequence’s being W need not imply anything about a speaker’s situation (see fn 14).41 Nothing 
39  The argument in the text can be represented thus:
 II(I’).  What a formula ‘P(x)’ says cannot outrun what a competent speaker understands it to say. 
(Connection between saying and understanding.)
 I(II’).  Hence, since all a speaker can manifest in the practice of assertion is what she takes to be a per-
monstration of ‘P(x)’ by a sequence, x0, x1, ... are the way ‘P(x)’ says they are iff ¡x0, x1, ...° per-
monstrates ‘P(x)’. (From (I’) and the manifestation constraint on understanding.)
 (III’).  Hence, a sequence satisfies ‘P(x)’ iff it permonstrates ‘P(x)’. (From (II’) and (SS).)
 (IV’).  Therefore, if a sentence is true, there is a demonstration of it. (From (III’) and the definitions of 
truth and demonstration.)
40  Cases in point are Tennant [1997], pp. 245-279 and, at least at a first glance, Dummett [2001]. 
T ennant [2002] criticizes Dummett for in effect restricting (TFPK) to atomic formulae, pointing out 
that (TFPK) is supposed to get much of its bite for, say, arithmetical discourse by including in its scope 
compound (in particular, quantified) formulae. That might seem like a fair criticism of Dummett’s pro-
posal (at least as the proposal was originally stated), but it would also seem that Tennant’s own restric-
tion is subject to a similar problem. For Tennant restricts (TFPK) to sentences that it is broadly logi-
cally possible to know, and so leaves out of its scope sentences like ‘Everyone is cognitively impaired’, 
thus preventing (TFPK) to have its supposed bite for certain quantifications over infinite empirical do-
mains. Worse, if it is conceded that sentences like ‘Everyone is cognitively impaired’ can be determined 
to be either true or false independently of our recognition of that, it is unclear on exactly what grounds 
it can still be maintained that other quantifications over infinite domains cannot be determined to be 
either true or false independently of our recognition of that. As for Dummett’s own proposal, I will 
comment a bit on it in fn 59, after introducing the relevant elements of the dialectic.
41  To go back to an example in fn 14, a speaker manifests her taking an object’s being such that, under 
ideal conditions, it would look red to the speaker to permonstrate ‘x is red’ by and only by being dis-
posed (under ideal conditions) to [apply ‘x is red’ to the object iff the object is such that, under ideal 
conditions, it would look red to the speaker] (which, under plausible assumptions, is tantamount to 
being disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply ‘x is red’ to the object iff the object looks red to the 
speaker]). And an object’s being such that, under ideal conditions, it would look red to the speaker im-
plies neither that the object looks red to the speaker nor that ideal conditions hold.
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more is required from a permonstration of φ(ξ) by a sequence. In particular, nothing more is 
required in terms of a speaker’s epistemic position.
Analogously, a speaker manifests her taking the permonstration condition of a com-
pound formula Ωφ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) (with Ω’s being an nary logical operator) to be a 
certain function of the permonstration conditions of φ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) (so that, say, 
things’ being W as regards the permonstration conditions of φ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) by 
a sequence is necessary and sufficient for the sequence’s permonstrating Ωφ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., 
φn–1(ξn–1)) by and only by, for every formulae ψ0(ξ0), ψ1(ξ1), ..., ψn–1(ξn–1), being disposed (un-
der ideal conditions) to [apply Ωψ0(ξ0), ψ1(ξ1), ..., ψn–1(ξn–1) to a sequence iff things are W as 
regards the permonstration conditions of ψ0(ξ0), ψ1(ξ1), ..., ψn–1(ξn–1) by the sequence]. But a 
sequence permonstrates Ωφ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) iff speakers take it to do so. Therefore, 
Ωφ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) is permonstrated by a sequence iff things are W as regards the 
permonstration conditions of φ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) by the sequence (rather than “seem 
to be W”) —where things’ being W as regards the permonstration conditions of φ0(ξ0), 
φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) by a sequence need not imply anything about a speaker’s situation (see 
fn 14). Nothing more is required from a permonstration of Ωφ0(ξ0), φ1(ξ1), ..., φn–1(ξn–1) by a 
sequence. In particular, nothing more is required in terms of a speaker’s epistemic position.
I submit that this is a basic fact about the logic of manifesting one’s understanding of a 
rule in general. Consider the manifestation of a player’s understanding of chess rules. All a 
player can do is, under certain conditions, to accept moves made in accordance with those 
rules and reject any other move, but this is crucially not taken to manifest the player’s under-
standing that, say, two chess situations s0 and s1 are such that s1 is a permissible development 
of s0 only if the player judges them to be so; what the player’s behaviour is taken to manifest 
is, rather, her understanding that s0 and s1 are such that s1 simply is a permissible develop-
ment of s0, no matter, say, whether anyone judges it to be so or not. The logic of manifesting 
one’s understanding is thus peculiarly opaque: what is understood is what is manifested, but 
what is manifested does not include the (unavoidable) fact that it is manifested.
A permonstration must thus be accurately distinguished from its knowledge-conferring 
implementation. It suffices for a sequence to permonstrate a formula φ(ξ) that it be, say, W, 
where, as we have seen in the third and second last paragraphs, a sequence’s being W need 
not imply anything about a speaker’s situation. But for a speaker to acquire knowledge that 
the objects of the sequence are the way φ(ξ) says they are the relevant extension and presen-
tation might need to occur. There is no general guarantee that these additional conditions 
are compatible with the way φ(ξ) says objects are, since the way φ(ξ) says objects are may ex-
actly be the way they are only if either of these conditions does not hold (respective toy 
counterexamples: ‘Everyone is drunk’ and ‘Everyone is in the dark’).42
42  Assuming that, as is the case with many other sentences, one can only perform the computations rele-
vant for deciding ‘Everyone is drunk’ while sober, the extension concerning the permonstration condi-
tion of ‘Everyone is drunk’ is incompatible with everyone’s being drunk (see fn 15); assuming that, as 
is the case with many other sentences, a good epistemic position for deciding ‘Everyone is in the dark’ 
involves some decent lighting, the presentation concerning the permonstration condition of ‘Everyone 
is in the dark’ is incompatible with everyone’s being in the dark (see fn 16). Thus, in the case of both 
sentences, conditions cannot be ideal for assertion of the sentence. I will discuss in the fifth next para-
graph in the text whether, on the view developed in this paper, this circumstance affects understanding 
of such sentences (see also fn 34). Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion of these examples.
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This distinction between a permonstration and its knowledge-conferring implemen-
tation is essential also to avoid an all too easy validation of the object-language condi-
tional φ(ξ0)  ξ1ξ2Kξ1,ξ2φ(ξ0) by an anti-realist semantics, validation which does not even 
go through the detour of the paradox of knowability (see Hart [1979], p. 165, fn 3; the in-
sightful reply in Williamson [1982], pp. 206-207 —hinging upon the distinction between 
a proof type and a proof token— has been a major source of inspiration for this paper). If 
the basic notion of an anti-realist semantics were the one of the possibility of a knowledge-
conferring implementation of a permonstration (where, of course, there would be a lot of 
room for manoeuvre in understanding exactly how tight the operative notion of possibility 
is), there could presumably be a knowledge-conferring implementation of a permonstra-
tion of φ(ξ0)  ξ1ξ2Kξ1,ξ2φ(ξ0) by a sequence iff, if there could be a knowledge-conferring 
implementation of a permonstration of φ(ξ0) by the sequence, then there could be a knowl-
edge-conferring implementation of a permonstration of ξ1ξ2Kξ1,ξ2φ(ξ0) by the sequence. And, necessarily, if there is a knowledge-conferring implementation of a permonstration 
by a sequence S of ‘There is a knowledge-conferring implementation of a permonstration 
of ‘φ(ξ0)’ by S’, there is also a knowledge-conferring implementation of a permonstration of 
ξ1ξ2Kξ1,ξ2φ(ξ0) by S. The absurd φ(ξ0)  ξ1ξ2Kξ1,ξ2φ(ξ0) would then be validated by the not absurd and indeed traditional epistemological view according to which, if there could be a 
knowledge-conferring implementation of a permonstration of φ(ξ) by a sequence S, there 
could also be a knowledge-conferring implementation of a permonstration of ‘There is a 
knowledge-conferring implementation of a permonstration of ‘φ(ξ)’ by S ’ by S.
The absurd φ(ξ0)  ξ1ξ2Kξ1,ξ2φ(ξ0) is not so validated if the basic notion of an anti-
realist semantics is the one of a permonstration rather than the one of the possibility of a 
knowledge-conferring implementation of a permonstration: for it is consistent, at least for 
a non-K-initial formula φ(ξ0), that there is a permonstration of φ(ξ0) by a sequence with-
out there being a knowledge-conferring implementation of it by the sequence, and so a for-
tiori without there being a permonstration of ξ1ξ2Kξ1,ξ2φ(ξ0) by the sequence, even in the 
extreme theoretical scenario in which there could not be a knowledge-conferring imple-
mentation of a permonstration of φ(ξ0) by a sequence S without there being a knowledge-
conferring implementation of a permonstration of ‘There is a knowledge-conferring imple-
mentation of a permonstration of ‘φ(ξ0)’ by S ’ by S.
The distinction between a permonstration and its knowledge-conferring implemen-
tation entails an analogous distinction between a demonstration and its knowledge-con-
ferring implementation. We can then see how, contrary to the (TFPK)-version of unre-
stricted anti-realism, the (TD)-version —the version of unrestricted anti-realism that is the 
conclusion of the proposed reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from understand-
ing— does not fall prey to the paradox of knowability. Mimicking the original Church-
Fitch reasoning, we can go from ‘There is a demonstration of ‘P and it is not known that 
P ’’ to ‘There is a demonstration of ‘P’ and there is a demonstration of ‘It is not known that 
P ’’ (by demonstration functionality of conjunction). But this is not absurd (as, on the con-
trary, ‘It is known [that P] and it is known that it is not known that P ’ is), since, as we have 
seen in the sixth and fifth last paragraphs, the existence of a demonstration of ‘P’ does not 
imply the existence or even the possibility of a knowledge-conferring implementation of 
the demonstration (even though it does imply the feasible possibility that it is known that 
P if ‘P’ is an atomic formula or the nple negation of an atomic formula, as should be clear 
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from putting together sections 4 and 5). The Church-Fitch reasoning thus breaks down: 
it is consistent that there is both a demonstration of ‘P’ and a demonstration of ‘It is not 
known that P ’, and therefore consistent (by demonstration functionality of conjunction) 
that there is a demonstration of ‘P and it is not known that P ’.43
But how does a specific Church-Fitch sentence like ‘There are 1,963 trees in St An-
drews and it is not known that there 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ exactly interact with the 
view developed in this paper? There is no problem in supposing that there is a possible sit-
uation ([under extension and presentation] concerning the demonstration condition of 
‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’) in which a speaker asserts ‘There are 1,963 trees in 
St Andrews’; equally, there is no problem in additionally supposing that there is a possible 
situation ([under extension and presentation] concerning the demonstration condition 
of ‘It is not known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’) in which she asserts ‘It is not 
known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’. But it does not follow from all this that 
there is a possible situation ([under extension and presentation] concerning the demon-
stration conditions of ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ and ‘It is not known that there 
are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’) in which she asserts ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ 
and asserts ‘It is not known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’. For, essentially by the 
argument in section 4, any possible situation ([under extension and presentation] concern-
ing the demonstration condition of ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’) in which she as-
serts ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ is a situation in which she knows that there are 
1,963 trees in St Andrews; however, essentially by the argument in section 4, any possible 
situation ([under extension and presentation] concerning the demonstration condition 
of ‘It is not known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’) in which she asserts ‘It is not 
known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ is a situation in which the demonstration 
condition of ‘It is not known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ holds, and so, by fac-
tivity of demonstration (see (DD) in fn 38), a situation in which it is not known that there 
are 1,963 trees in St Andrews. Therefore, there is no possible situation ([under extension 
and presentation] concerning the demonstration conditions of ‘There are 1,963 trees in St 
Andrews’ and ‘It is not the case that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’) in which she as-
serts ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ and asserts ‘It is not known that there are 1,963 
trees in St Andrews’. Conditions cannot be ideal for assertions of both sentences. And, by 
a similar argument, conditions cannot be ideal for assertions of the negations of both sen-
tences, so that conditions can only be ideal for assertion of one sentence and assertion of 
the negation of the other sentence (see fn 45 for more details).
Letting φ0 be ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ and ψ1 be ‘It is not known that 
there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’, in this case it is thus vacuously true that a speaker is 
disposed ([under extension and presentation] concerning the permonstration conditions 
of φ(ξ0) and ψ(ξ1) by a sequence) to [apply  φ(ξ0) ∧ ψ(ξ1) to the sequence iff she applies φ(ξ0) 
to it and applies ψ(ξ1) to it] (in the sense that both sides of the embedded biconditional 
are always untrue). Still, going back to an issue emerged in section 4, a speaker can non-
vacuously manifest her understanding of ∧ in relation to many other pairs of sentences (as 
we have observed in the last paragraph, even in relation to ‘There are 1,963 trees in St An-
43  Of course, given demonstration functionality of conjunction and factivity of demonstration (see (DD) 
in fn 38), one can successfully mimic the original Church-Fitch reasoning with respect to ‘P and there 
is no demonstration of ‘P ’’, but that only yields (TD) all over again.
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drews’ and ‘It is known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ or in relation to ‘It is not 
the case that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’ and ‘It is not known that there are 1,963 
trees in St Andrews’!); moreover, since she can unproblematically manifest her understand-
ing of the two component sentences of ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews and it is not 
known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews’, as per section 4 it follows by composition-
ality that she does understand that sentence.
Obviously, the view developed in this paper raises a host of issues, of which I would like 
to discuss a particularly salient one. It might rightly be observed that my talk of demonstra-
tions is rather unsubstantial: keeping in mind the telling case of negation, I have basically 
stipulated that the non-existence of a demonstration of φ suffices for the existence of a dem-
onstration of φ. That prevents demonstrations from being always guaranteed to be “con-
structive objects” —that is, roughly, objects consisting of a structure of procedures. And doesn’t 
that in turn take any interesting epistemic bite out of the existence of a demonstration? It 
doesn’t. Although, as I have been stressing in this section, the existence of a demonstration 
has an objective component that makes it non-reducible to facts about possible knowledge, the 
view developed in this paper still has very clear and substantial epistemic consequences.
Firstly, it’s easy to see that the existence of a demonstration of φ still entails, by permon-
stration functionality, a certain pattern of permonstrations or lack thereof for the atomic 
formulae occurring in φ; as I have mentioned in the fourth last paragraph, for such formu-
lae and their negations permonstrations can always be implemented in a knowledge-confer-
ring way, and the view developed in this paper does nothing to cast into doubt the extremely 
plausible principle that logical operators are “scrutable” in the sense that, if the truth value 
of each component is known, the truth value of the compound formula is feasibly knowable 
(quite the contrary, under extremely plausible assumptions the view developed in this paper 
actually allows one to prove such principle). In other, looser words, the existence of a dem-
onstration of φ entails that the basic facts making φ true are feasibly knowable, and that these 
compose the fact described by φ via successive applications of feasibly knowable operations.
Secondly, a simple induction shows that the view developed in this paper entails the 
principle of knowledge of truth under ideal conditions:
(ICTK) Under ideal conditions, if ‘P’ is true, it is known that P44
44  Proof. We prove that, under ideal conditions, a speaker tracks whether P, which, as per fn 19, is 
throughout assumed to suffice for the fact that, under ideal conditions, if ‘P’ is true, it is known that 
P. As said, the proof is by induction. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume the en-
riched language and expanded definition mentioned in fn 36.
 — Base case. If ‘P’ is atomic, by the argument in sections 4 and 5, under ideal conditions, a speaker as-
serts ‘P’ iff P.
 — Inductive step.
 r *G ‘P’ is of the form ‘Q0 and Q1’, by the clause for ∧, under ideal conditions, a speaker asserts ‘Q0 
and Q1’ iff she asserts ‘Q0’ and asserts ‘Q1’, and so, by the induction hypothesis, iff Q0 and Q1.
 r *G‘P’ is of the form ‘Q0 or Q1’, by the clause for ∨, under ideal conditions, a speaker asserts ‘Q0 or 
Q1’ iff she asserts ‘Q0’ or asserts ‘Q1’, and so, by the induction hypothesis, iff Q0 or Q1.
 r *G‘P’ is of the form ‘If Q0, then Q1’, by the clause for ⊃, under ideal conditions, a speaker asserts ‘If 
Q0, then Q1’ iff, if she asserts ‘Q0’, then she asserts ‘Q1’, and so, by the induction hypothesis, iff, if 
Q0, then Q1.
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(it’s just that, in the case of a Church-Fitch sentence, under ideal conditions the sentence is 
always untrue and (so) not known and (indeed) such that its negation is known).45
In fact, for several reasons independent of the specific view developed in this paper, 
(ICTK) rather than (TFPK) would seem to be the from-truth-to-knowledge principle an 
anti-realist should go for.46 To start with, the most fundamental from-truth-to-knowledge 
principle is the principle of knowledge of truth:
(TK) If ‘P’ is true, it is known that P.
An anti-realist retreats from (TK) to weaker from-truth-to-knowledge principles such as 
(TFPK) or (ICTK) not because (TK) is fundamentally wrong, but simply because of the 
annoying fact that, while fundamentally right, (TK) suffers from boring counterexam-
ples basically due to failures to perform relevant computations or to be at the right place at 
the right time. If so, an anti-realist should simply screen off such complications, by main-
taining that (TK) holds as long as they are absent —that is, as long as conditions are ideal. 
(ICTK) is such version of (TK), whereas (TFPK), far from being such, is an extraneous 
principle oddly requiring the compatibility of these complications with conditions’ be-
ing ideal. Moreover, focussing on anti-realism as motivated by the manifestation constraint 
 r *G‘P’ is of the form ‘It is not the case that Q ’, by the clause for , under ideal conditions, a speaker 
asserts ‘It is not the case that Q ’ iff she does not assert ‘Q’, and so, by the induction hypothesis, iff 
it is not the case that Q.
 r *G‘P’ is of the form ‘For every x, Q(x)’, by the clause for , under ideal conditions, a speaker asserts 
‘For every x, Q(x)’ iff, for every a (substitutional quantification), she asserts ‘Q(a)’, and so, by the 
induction hypothesis, iff, for every a, Q(a), and so iff, for every x (objectual quantification), Q(x).
 r *G‘P’ is of the form ‘For some x, Q(x)’, by the clause for , under ideal conditions, a speaker asserts ‘For 
some x, Q(x)’ iff, for some a (substitutional quantification), she asserts ‘Q(a)’, and so, by the induction 
hypothesis, iff, for some a, Q(a), and so iff, for some x (objectual quantification), Q(x). QED.
45  More in detail, taking again as Church-Fitch sentence ‘There are 1,963 trees in St Andrews and it is 
not known that there 1,963 trees in St Andrews’, under ideal conditions either there are 1,963 trees in 
St Andrews or it is not the case that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews, and, by (ICTK), the speaker 
knows which. If she knows that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews, by (ICTK) she knows that it is 
known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews, and so knows that it is not the case that [there are 
1,963 trees in St Andrews and it is not known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews]; if she knows 
that it is not the case that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews, she knows that it is not the case that 
[there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews and it is not known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews] 
(and, by (ICTK), she knows that it is not known that there are 1,963 trees in St Andrews).
46  I should stress however that, on the view developed in this paper, the most fundamental epistemic con-
straint, the one that is the direct outcome of the argument from understanding is (TD). (Since, as I have 
emphasized in this section, the existence of a demonstration has an objective component that makes it 
non-reducible to facts about possible knowledge, (TD) is not a from-truth-to-knowledge principle, but, 
since, as I have argued in the first point in the text concerning the epistemic consequences of the view 
developed in this paper, the existence of a demonstration does have very clear and substantial epistemic 
consequences, (TD) is an epistemic constraint.) (ICTK) is rather a by-product of the machinery used in 
the argument from understanding. But it is a crucial such by-product all the same, on the one hand, be-
cause it further highlights that that machinery has very clear and substantial epistemic consequences and, 
on the other hand, because its congeniality to general anti-realist thinking (which I am about to argue for 
in the text) can be taken as a further confirmation that the machinery is on the right track.
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on understanding, the essential idea is that the link between meaning and use is forged un-
der ideal conditions, and so it should just be expected that, similarly, the resulting link be-
tween truth and knowledge also holds under ideal conditions. (ICTK) places the link ex-
actly there, whereas (TFPK), far from doing so, postulates a weird, “transconditional” link 
between truth under non-ideal conditions and knowledge under some ideal conditions. 
(BTW, why only “some”?!) Finally, from a more eschatological point of view, the natural 
idea of “epistemic doomsday” is the ameliorative one of a condition in which all our present 
defects are eliminated so that everything that is then the case is revealed (see e.g. 1 Corinthians, 
13: 8-12). (ICTK) is a version of that idea, whereas (TFPK), far from being such, is a ver-
sion of the heterodox, conciliatory idea of epistemic doomsday as of a condition in which 
all our present defects are among the things that are revealed. An anti-realist has ample rea-
sons to shift her focus from what can feasibly be known to what is known under ideal condi-
tions (possibly even under an unusually broad sense of ‘ideal’, see fn 34).47
7. Consequences for Intuitionism
Having observed all this, the view developed in this paper can in principle be so modified 
as to yield constructive demonstrations along the lines of the famous, so-called BHK se-
mantics (from Brouwer [1907]; Kolmogorov [1932]; Heyting [1934], in an order that is 
to me unclear) which typically accompanies adoption of intuitionist logic. This can be done 
by modifying the clauses for ,  and  bringing into play the further speech acts of con-
ditional application and rejection of application. More in detail, as for  a speaker may be 
disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply φ(ξ0)  ψ(ξ1) to a sequence iff she applies ψ(ξ1) 
to it conditionally on φ(ξ0)].48,49 She thereby (plausibly) manifests her taking the existence 
47  The move from (TFPK) to (ICTK) broadly correlates to the move, in the debate on response depend-
ence, from what Wright [1992], pp. 108-139 calls ‘basic equations’ to what he calls ‘provisional equa-
tions’. The limitation that Wright brings out concerning the move to provisional equations in the 
case of response dependence —that they leave truth under non-ideal conditions epistemically uncon-
strained— would not seem to have a correlate applying to the overall view developed in this paper, 
since, even under non-ideal conditions, by (TD) the truth of φ requires the existence of a demonstra-
tion of φ, and, as per the first point in the text concerning the view’s epistemic consequences, even un-
der non-ideal conditions the existence of a demonstration of φ entails that the basic facts making φ 
true are feasibly knowable, and that these compose the fact described by φ via successive applications of 
feasibly knowable operations.
48  Such conditional application is stronger than the material-implicational fact about application to the ef-
fect that, if the speaker applies φ(ξ0) to the sequence, she applies ψ(ξ1) to it (analogously to how the 
conditional belief that, given P, Q is stronger than the material-implicational fact about belief to the ef-
fect that, if one believes that P, one believes that Q). For example, since I do not apply ‘x is Spanish’ to 
the person I have just seen in the Rossio, by the properties of material implication it follows that, if I 
apply ‘x is Spanish’ to her, I apply ‘x is French’ to her, even though, of course, it is not the case that I 
apply ‘x is French’ to her conditionally on ‘x is Spanish’ (conversely, by closure of application under con-
ditional application, conditional application does entail the corresponding material-implicational fact 
about application).
49  To go back to the issue discussed in fn 32, it is not the case that, by the properties of conditional appli-
cation, provided that a speaker does not apply φ(ξ0) to a sequence it follows that she applies ψ(ξ1) to it 
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of a procedure taking any permonstration of φ(ξ0) by a sequence into a permonstration of 
ψ(ξ1) by it to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence to permonstrate 
φ(ξ0)  ψ(ξ1). As for , a speaker may be disposed (under ideal conditions) to [apply φ(ξ) 
to a sequence iff she rejects applying φ(ξ) to it].50,51 She thereby (plausibly) manifests her 
taking the existence of a procedure taking any permonstration of φ(ξ) by a sequence into 
a permonstration of the absurdity by it to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
sequence to permonstrate φ(ξ). As for , a speaker may be disposed (under ideal condi-
tions) to [apply ξ0φ(ξ1) to a sequence iff, for every sequence differing from the original se-
quence at most at its ξ0-corresponding coordinate, she applies φ(ξ1) to it conditionally on 
the object at its ξ0-corresponding coordinate being in the domain].52 She thereby (plausi-
bly) manifests her taking the existence of a procedure taking any permonstration that an 
object at the ξ0-corresponding coordinate of a sequence differing from a sequence at most 
at its ξ0-corresponding coordinate is in the domain into a permonstration of φ(ξ1) by the 
former sequence to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the latter sequence to per-
monstrate ξ0φ(ξ1).
However, in the present context such constructive demonstrations are arguably the re-
alist’s Trojan horse. For, given that, for some P, P and it is not known that P, it follows that 
there is a (broadly) mathematical object constituting the constructive demonstration of the cor-
responding sentence which is not feasibly (or metaphysically) knowable.53 And, if an anti-real-
conditionally on φ(ξ0). It is indeed the case that, by the properties of conditional application, provided 
that a speaker rejects applying φ(ξ0) to a sequence it follows that she applies ψ(ξ1) to it conditionally on 
φ(ξ0). And, whether or not conditions are ideal, it is not crazy for a speaker to apply φ(ξ0)  ψ(ξ1) to a 
sequence simply because she rejects applying φ(ξ0) to it.
50  Such rejection of application is stronger than the negative fact about application to the effect that the 
speaker does not apply φ(ξ) to the sequence (analogously to how the rejection that P is stronger than 
the negative fact about belief to the effect that one does not believe that P). For example, I do not apply 
‘x is Spanish’ to the person I have just seen in the Rossio, even though, of course, it is not the case that I 
reject applying ‘x is Spanish’ to her (conversely, by exclusivity of rejection of application and application, 
rejection of application does entail the corresponding negative fact about application).
51  To go back to the issue discussed in fn 33, whether or not conditions are ideal it is not crazy for a 
speaker to apply φ(ξ) to a sequence simply because she rejects applying φ(ξ) to it.
52  Similarly to how a speaker’s application of ψ(ξ1) to a sequence conditional on φ(ξ0) is stronger than the ma-
terial-implicational fact about application to the effect that, if she applies φ(ξ0) to it, she applies ψ(ξ1) to it 
(see fn 48), so a speaker’s application of φ(ξ1) to a sequence and to every sequence differing from the origi-
nal sequence at most at its ξ0-corresponding coordinate conditional on the object at its ξ0-corresponding 
coordinate being in the domain is stronger than the universal fact about application to the effect that, for 
every relevant sequence differing from the original sequence at most at its ξ0-corresponding coordinate, 
she applies φ(ξ1) to it. For example, if the domain is the set of students of my class (these being Afonso, 
Bento, ..., and, unbeknownst to me, not including António), since I apply ‘x is either Afonso, or Bento, ...’ 
to each of Afonso, Bento, ... it follows that, for every object in the domain, I apply ‘x is either Afonso, or 
Bento, ...’ to her, even though, of course, it is not the case that I apply ‘x is either Afonso, or Bento, ...’ to 
António conditionally on António’s being a student of my class (conversely, by closure of application un-
der conditional application, and assuming that the speaker knows of the objects in the domain that they 
are in the domain, conditional application does entail the corresponding universal fact about applica-
tion).
53  Throughout, by ‘An object is knowable’ and its like, I mean that it is knowable what its characterizing 
properties are.
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ist is happy to admit such objects, what’s the fuss about usual mathematical objects having 
to be feasibly knowable?54
54  Within the anti-realist tradition, there is a long-standing approach —which could aptly be called “the 
Stockholm approach”— that treats constructive demonstrations as self-standing objects and deploys 
this conception to address the paradox of knowability by accepting (TD) under the understanding 
that such self-standing constructive demonstrations are in some cases feasibly unknowable (see Praw-
itz [1987] for an early work containing a general statement of such conception of constructive dem-
onstrations and Cozzo [1994]; Pagin [1994] for two seminal works deploying the conception to ad-
dress the paradox of knowability; pace Prawitz [1998b], p. 48, Prawitz [1998a], pp. 302-303 explicitly 
endorses such application, whereas, although Martin-Löf is sometimes mentioned in connection with 
the Stockholm approach, Martin-Löf [2013], pp. 12-13 apparently accepts an unrestricted principle 
implying that, if it is not feasibly knowable that P, it is not the case that P, which basically contradicts 
the Stockholm approach). (More specifically, Cozzo [1994] adopts a positive stance, but fills in the de-
tails of his account in such a way as actually not to deliver the target view (thus highlighting just how un-
natural the postulation of feasibly unknowable constructive demonstrations is). For Cozzo claims that, 
if φ is true, there is an “ideal argument” for φ, which is supposed to be an argument for φ that would be 
accepted in an “ideal epistemic situation” for φ, which is in turn supposed to be a situation that would be 
reached in the long run if an inquiry concerning φ were to be pursued in the best way etc. Since in every 
ideal epistemic situation for a Church-Fitch sentence a speaker knows its negation (see fn 45), and so a 
fortiori does not accept any argument for the sentence, it follows that there is no ideal argument for any 
Church-Fitch sentence, and so, contraposing on Cozzo’s version of (TD), that every Church-Fitch sen-
tence is untrue, thereby falling prey to the paradox of knowability. Pagin [1994] adopts a more negative 
stance, containing a perceptive discussion of some of the problems incurred by a traditional anti-realist if 
she accepts feasibly unknowable constructive demonstrations (not the one I have insisted on in the text, 
see fn 58) and of the relevance of compositionality for some of the issues raised by the paradox of know-
ability. Prawitz [1998a], pp. 302-303 also adopts a positive stance, but does so at the expense of jeopard-
izing a series of other traditional anti-realist tenets (in addition to the one of the feasible knowability of 
mathematical objects). For Prawitz claims that, for every Church-Fitch sentence, the bare collection of the 
demonstrations of its two conjuncts is a demonstration of the sentence. But, by the same token, for every 
universal quantification the bare collection of the demonstrations of all its instances should be a demon-
stration of the quantification, a consequence which is however multiply unacceptable for a traditional 
anti-realist. To begin with, that consequence contradicts the BHK definition of what a demonstration of 
a universal quantification is. Moreover, it would seem to validate a generalized version of the ω-rule, thus 
leading to accepting deductive systems that are extraordinarily strong —indeed, typically negation com-
plete (unless one goes in for some wacky non-classical metatheory of deductive systems). Finally, it does 
no longer support the relevant versions of one of the most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision 
of classical logic that we will consider in the second next paragraph in the text (for we have reason to doubt 
‘Either there is a demonstration of ‘Everything is F ’ or there is a demonstration of ‘It is not the case that 
everything is F ’’ only if we have reasons to doubt ‘Either there is a demonstration of ‘Everything is F ’ or 
there is a demonstration of ‘Something is not F ’’, but, by the consequence under consideration and the 
clause for , the latter now boils down to ‘Either there is a demonstration of every instance of ‘Everything 
is F ’ or there is a demonstration of some instance ‘Everything is not F ’’, which, given that, in the interest-
ing versions of this revisionary argument, being F is decidable and so ‘There is no demonstration of ‘a is 
F’’ is equivalent with ‘There is a demonstration of ‘a is not F’’, in turn boils down to simply another in-
stance of the classical law ‘Either everything is F or something is not F ’ (‘Either there is a demonstration 
of every instance of ‘Everything is F ’ or there is no demonstration of some instance of ‘Everything is F’’), 
and no reason has been given by the revisionary argument to doubt that). Notice that, although unac-
ceptable for these reasons, such take on demonstrations of universal quantifications seems actually forced 
not only by Prawitz’ take on demonstrations of Church-Fitch sentences, but also by his reduction of truth 
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Crucially, no such realist attack can be mounted against the non-constructive demonstra-
tions envisaged by the view developed in this paper. The existence of a non-constructive dem-
onstration of an atomic sentence reduces to things’ being in a certain way couchable in a basic 
vocabulary that does not involve talk of demonstrations and procedures (as it also happens in 
the case of constructive demonstrations); by non-constructive-permonstration functionality, so 
does the existence of a non-constructive demonstration of a compound sentence (as it does not 
happen in the case of constructive demonstrations, at least for ,  and , since the clauses 
given in the second last paragraph introduce objects whose existence is not reducible to things’ be-
ing in any way couchable in a basic vocabulary that does not involve talk of demonstrations and 
procedures).55 And, while we have seen in sections 4, 5 and 6 that it is not a consequence of 
the anti-realist argument from understanding that every way things are is feasibly knowable, 
it’s hard to see how an anti-realist can maintain that [a mathematical object like, say, a choice 
function for a particular family of sets can only be admitted if it is feasibly knowable whereas 
a mathematical object like a certain constructive demonstration should be admitted although 
it is not feasibly knowable]. Therefore, although the introduction of constructive demonstra-
tions is in principle possible, it is not open precisely to an anti-realist. The paradox of knowabil-
ity provides a hitherto unnoticed reason for an anti-realist to reject the BHK semantics.56
to the existence of a demonstration, given that the truth (and so, by Prawitz’ reduction, the existence of a 
demonstration) of every instance extremely plausibly constitutes the truth (and so, by Prawitz’ reduc-
tion, the existence of a demonstration) of the corresponding universal quantification.) While sharing 
some features of the view developed in this paper, the Stockholm approach is subject to the problem raised 
in the text (Dummett [1982] offers an early statement of the problem when considering the hypothesis 
that there are feasibly unknowable constructive demonstrations of mathematical sentences, although he 
does not bring the point to bear on the paradox of knowability). Something like the Stockholm approach 
has recently been adopted by a few other authors, in my view without significant improvements as far as 
the problem raised in the text is concerned (for example, Hand [2010] imposes a ban on any considera-
tion that is not meaning-theoretic —without hinting at which finely discriminating meaning-theoretic 
argument is supposed to establish the knowability of choice functions but not of constructive demon-
strations— while Dean and Kurokawa [2010] go for a language in which the contents of Church-Fitch 
sentences are inexpressible —thus making one wonder what is so bad about the (TFPK)-version of un-
restricted anti-realism). A glaring gap in all these works is that they simply assume their favoured version 
of (TD) without explaining what argument is supposed to yield it in the first place (a point pressed e.g. by 
Murzi [2012], pp. 24-25), contrary to the attempt I have made on behalf of my favoured version of (TD) 
in sections 4 and 5. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging a discussion of this literature.
55  This reducibility implies that we are really associating truth with facts rather than with objects. That is 
not only more natural, but also avoids cardinality worries that I will not go into in this paper.
56  If the anti-realistically offending non-reducible demonstrations are those for certain conjunctions, 
could an anti-realist uphold non-reducible demonstrations for at least the intuitionistically central cases 
of conditionals, negations and universal quantifications, and go for some sort of reductive account as the 
one I myself have advocated in the case of (some?) conjunctions? Would that avoid commitment to 
feasibly unknowable objects while preserving enough features of the BHK semantics as to still support 
the relevant versions of one of the most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision of classi-
cal logic that we will consider in the next paragraph in the text? Without even in passing remarking on 
the adhocness of such manoeuvre, and also setting completely aside the definability of conjunctions in 
terms of higher-order universal quantifications and conditionals (see Prawitz [1965], pp. 67-68), the an-
swer is negative. As for universal quantifications, some non-reducible demonstrations of them would 
be feasibly unknowable (given the equivalence between ‘P and Q ’ and ‘Every sentence that is either ‘P’ 
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There is more bad news for intuitionism. Not only is one of its most congenial semantics 
foreclosed by the paradox of knowability; contrary to the BHK semantics, the related but al-
ternative semantics coming with the view developed in this paper (which, in view of its simple 
functionality, might be called ‘EZ semantics’, US pronunciation) no longer supports one of the 
most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision of classical logic. For example, if the 
(TFPK)-version of unrestricted anti-realism holds ‘Either P or it is not the case that P ’ im-
plies ‘Either it is feasibly knowable that P or it is feasibly knowable that it is not the case that 
P ’. Yet, one of the most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision of classical logic 
claims that, even if the (TFPK)-version of unrestricted anti-realism holds, we do not have suf-
ficient reasons for accepting every instance of ‘Either it is feasibly knowable that P or it is fea-
sibly knowable that it is not the case that P ’,57 from which it plausibly follows that we do not 
or ‘Q’ is true’). As for conditionals and negations, I presume that we only want to envisage procedures 
taking any permonstration of a certain kind into a permonstration of the absurdity (i.e. non-reducible 
demonstrations of negations) if we are ready more generally to envisage procedures taking any per-
monstration of a certain kind into a permonstration of a certain kind (i.e. non-reducible demonstra-
tions of conditionals). But then some non-reducible demonstrations of negations would be feasibly 
unknowable (given that it is just as plausible that, [for some P, it is not the case that, if it is not the case 
that P, it is known that it is not the case that P] as it is that, [for some P, P and it is not known that P], 
and given that every witness for the former claim entails both that it is not the case that P and that it is 
not known that it is not the case that P, thus being metaphysically unknowable by the Church-Fitch 
reasoning). Thanks to Sven Rosenkranz for discussion of this move.
57  You might think that the claim is clearly correct because it is clearly the case that it is possible that, 
for some P, it is neither feasibly knowable that P nor feasibly knowable that it is not the case that P. 
However, as soon as (TFPK) includes ‘P’ and its negation in its scope, that possibility is actually ruled 
out by (contraposed) (TFPK) and the law of non-contradiction. Someone might suppose that one 
can preserve the possibility of feasibly necessary ignorance at the cost of the law of non-contradiction: 
if that supposition were correct, the revisionary argument would arguably turn into an argument for 
a broadly dual-intuitionist rather than broadly intuitionist revision of classical logic (Incurvati and 
Murzi [2008], p. 308, fn 9, who endorse the supposition, suggest that what the revisionary argument 
could turn into is an argument for Nelson’s logic N3, which is doubly odd since, by (TFPK), the pos-
sibility of feasibly necessary ignorance whether P implies the possibility of a contradiction (‘It is not the 
case that P and it is not the case that it is not the case that P ’) which, far from implying the possibility 
that the law of excluded middle fails, implies the possibility of its relevant instance (‘Either P or it is not 
the case that P ’), whereas N3 is not paraconsistent and does not validate the law of excluded middle). But 
the supposition does violence to the natural understanding of the possibility of feasibly necessary ignorance 
whether P, since (TFPK) also implies that, if it is not the case P, it is feasibly knowable that it is not the 
case that P, which certainly wasn’t what you thought when you thought that it is clearly the case that it 
is possible that there is feasibly necessary ignorance whether P. Ignorance excludes knowledge. (Some-
one else might suppose that one can preserve the possibility of feasibly necessary ignorance by postu-
lating that the operative conditional operator in (TFPK) is not contraposable, and preserve the validity 
of the revisionary argument by postulating at the same time that it is detachable in disjunctive environ-
ments. But that supposition is incoherent, since, if the operative conditional operator in (TFPK) is de-
tachable in disjunctive environments, ‘Either P or it is not the case that P ’ implies ‘Either it is feasibly 
knowable that P or it is not the case that P ’, which in turn intuitionistically entails ‘If it is not feasibly 
knowable that P, it is not the case that P ’; if a finite collection of those conditionals leads to a false-
hood, so would then the finite collection of the corresponding instances of the law of excluded middle, 
which is however intuitionistically absurd.) But, if the possibility of feasibly necessary ignorance which 
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have sufficient reasons for accepting every instance of ‘Either P or it is not the case that P ’. 
Similarly, if the (TD)-version of unrestricted anti-realism based on constructive demonstra-
tions holds, ‘Either P or it is not the case that P ’ implies ‘Either there is a constructive dem-
onstration of ‘P’ or there is a constructive demonstration of ‘It is not the case that P ’’. Yet, es-
sentially the same revisionary argument claims that, even if the (TD)-version of unrestricted 
anti-realism based on constructive demonstrations holds, we do not have sufficient reasons 
for accepting every instance of ‘Either there is a constructive demonstration of ‘P’ or there 
is a constructive demonstration of ‘It is not the case that P ’’,58 from which it plausibly fol-
lows that we do not have sufficient reasons for accepting every instance of ‘Either P or it is 
not the case that P ’. Be that as it may with respect to the revisionary argument qua relying on 
the (TFPK)-version of unrestricted anti-realism or qua relying on the (TD)-version of unre-
stricted anti-realism based on constructive demonstrations, it is clear that the revisionary ar-
gument qua relying on the (TD)-version of unrestricted anti-realism based on non-construc-
tive demonstrations is a non-starter. For ‘Either there is a demonstration of ‘P’ or there is a 
demonstration of ‘It is not the case that P ’’ now boils down to simply another instance of the 
law of excluded middle (‘Either there is a demonstration of ‘P’ or there is no demonstration of 
‘P ’’), and no reason has been given by the revisionary argument to doubt that.59
would typically be taken to ground the alleged fact that we do not have sufficient reasons for accepting 
every instance of ‘Either it is feasibly knowable that P or it is feasibly knowable that it is not the case 
that P ’ is ruled out, what else is left to ground that alleged fact? As far as I can see, pretty much noth-
ing. If so, given that, as I have just argued, the clash between (TFPK) and feasibly necessary ignorance 
is irremediable, keeping fixed the relevant instances of (TFPK) we do have sufficient reasons for ac-
cepting the relevant instances of ‘Either it is feasibly knowable that P or it is feasibly knowable that it is 
not the case that P ’. Wherever (TFPK) rules, not only there is no ignorabimus, but also, one way or the 
other, we will know. (Anticlimax: having noted all this, I will henceforth leave it to proponents of the 
revisionary argument to fix these problems, and turn instead to an even more straightforward problem 
that would be caused by adoption of the anti-realistically acceptable EZ semantics.)
58  I would here side with Cozzo [1994], p. 77 against Pagin [1994], p. 99 in considering this to be a plau-
sible claim: given what specific kind of objects constructive demonstrations are (whether feasibly knowable 
or not), I do not see that we have sufficient reasons for accepting every instance of ‘Either there is a con-
structive demonstration of ‘P’ or there is a constructive demonstration of ‘It is not the case that P ’’. In my 
view, the problem with feasibly unknowable demonstrations is not that they spoil the revisionary argu-
ment qua relying on the (TD)-version of unrestricted anti-realism based on constructive demonstrations, 
but that they contradict the traditional anti-realist idea that mathematical objects are feasibly knowable.
59  Dummett [2001]’s proposal, which basically consists in letting the truth of atomic sentences be epis-
temically constrained by (TFPK) and then giving the standard characterization of truth for compound 
sentences, has much to recommend it. Unfortunately, contrary to the view developed in this paper 
Dummett strangely does not ground his proposal in the anti-realist argument from understanding (nor 
in any other argument for anti-realism). In addition to making his proposal rather unprincipled, that 
makes it less clear than it could be that his proposal too can actually be seen as endorsing the (TD)-ver-
sion of unrestricted anti-realism based on a certain kind of demonstrations (with the clauses for com-
pound formulae being orthographically identical with mine but understood in the different way I will 
mention below), and that, on his proposal too, the existence of a demonstration of φ entails that the 
basic facts making φ true are feasibly knowable, and that these compose the fact described by φ via suc-
cessive applications of feasibly knowable operations. More negatively, the lack of grounding in the anti-
realist argument from understanding precludes Dummett’s proposal from supporting an unrestricted 
from-truth-to-knowledge principle like (ICTK). Interestingly, in order to save intuitionism Dummett 
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In conclusion, the view developed in this paper vindicates a moderate version of Göde-
lian optimism (see Tennant [1997], pp. 166-167): by (ICTK) (and the unscathed law 
of excluded middle), for every P, under ideal conditions, either it is known that P or it is 
known that it is not the case that P (see fn 57 for further support for Gödelian optimism, 
and fn 34 for an additional line of thought that, extending the range of ideal conditions, 
would strengthen the import of (ICTK)). The usual objection to such optimism —the 
worry that, for some P, there is no reason for thinking that, even under ideal conditions, 
either there is a demonstration of ‘P’ or there is a demonstration of ‘It is not the case that 
P ’— rests on the constructive assumption that the existence of a demonstration of ‘It is not 
the case that P ’ is something that goes beyond the non-existence of a demonstration of ‘P ’. 
Precisely from an anti-realist point of view, that assumption is mistaken because it relies on a 
conception of a range of objects —constructive demonstrations— that is shown to be un-
tenable by the paradox of knowability. On the only notion of negation that this paper has 
argued to be anti-realistically acceptable, under ideal conditions any remaining ignorance 
that P is transfigured into knowledge that it is not the case that P.
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